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111. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case 
This is a lawsuit brought by the Estate of Aldina Ekic and Aldina's parents, 
Ibrahim and Halida Ekic ("the Ekics") against GEICO Indemnity Company ("GEICO") for 
alleged breach of contract, misrepresentation, bad faith, and promissory estoppel. The 
Ekics disputed GEICO's interpretation of the underinsured motorists ("UIM") provision in 
Aldina Ekic's automobile insurance policy. GEICO contended that the language of its 
UIM amendment in Ms. Ekic's policy precluded the Ekics' claim. The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of GEICO on all of the Ekics' claims. The District 
Court then granted costs and attorney fees to GEICO because the District Court found 
that the Ekics' lawsuit was brought frivolously, unreasonably and without 
foundation. The Ekics now appeal the granting of summary judgment and the award of 
attorney fees. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Ekics filed a Complaint against GEICO in Ada County District Court 
on October 30, 2015, alleging claims for breach of contract, misrepresentation and bad 
faith . R: 08 (Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial). GEICO filed an Answer on 
December 18, 2015. R: 016 (Answer and Demand for Jury Trial). GEICO propounded 
Discovery Requests to the Ekics on January 5, 2016. R: 03. A Status Conference was 
held February 22, 2016, after which the parties jointly submitted a Stipulation for 
Scheduling and Planning, whereupon the 
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Court issued a Scheduling Order. R: 03, 21-31. On February 28, 2016, Plaintiffs 
served responses to GEICO's Discovery Requests. R: 38-47 (Plaintiffs' Answers to 
Defendant's First Set of Discovery). 
GEICO filed a motion for summary judgment on April 5, 2016. R: 03, 33-
97. On May 5, 2016, the Ekics filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to add a cause of 
action for promissory estoppel. R: 03, 0114-5. A hearing was held on GEICO's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on May 16, 2016, after which the District Court issued its Order 
Granting Motion for Summary Judgment. R: 04, 147-9. 
The District Court entered an Order for Additional Briefing as to the Motion 
to Amend on June 14, 2016, after which the Ekics filed a Brief in Support of Motion to 
Amend Complaint. R: 04, 150-9. The District Court granted leave for filing the 
Amended Complaint on August 18, 2016. R: 04, 17-2. The Ekics filed the Amended 
Complaint on August 23, 2016, and GEICO filed an Answer and Demand for Jury Trial 
on October 5, 2016. R: 04, 192-205. 
The Ekics propounded interrogatories and requests for production to 
GEICO on September 25, 2016. R: 0201. GEICO served Answers and Responses to 
the Ekics' Discovery Requests on October 26, 2016. R: 0207. 
On November 1, 2016, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion to Continue 
Trial. R: 0209. In the Stipulated Motion, the parties represented to the District Court 
that "Defendant anticipates that it will bring a second motion for summary judgment as 
to Plaintiffs' new claim of promissory estoppel." R: 0210. The District Court granted the 
Stipulated Motion. R: 0211 . The District Court then convened a telephonic status 
conference, and subsequently issued a Scheduling Order, setting oral argument on 
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GEICO's second motion for summary judgment for January 30, 2017. R: 0213. GEICO 
then filed its second motion for summary judgment on December 14, 2016. R: 0215. 
Approximately two weeks before the scheduled hearing on GEICO's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, the Ekics filed a Motion to Defer Hearing on 
Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment for 60 days And For Additional 
Time Pursuant to Rule 56(d)(1) and (2), IRCP. R: 0222-4. On January 24, 2017, the 
District Court entered its Order Denying Motion to Defer Hearing. R: 0227-8. 
A hearing was held on GEICO's Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
on February 2, 2017, and the District Court granted the motion from the bench. R: 
0229. On February 3, 2017, the District Court issued its Order Granting GEICO's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment. R: 0230-2. The District Court then issued a 
Judgment on February 3, 2017. R: 0233-4. 
On February 8, 2017, GEICO filed a Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees. R: 0235-243. On February 17, 2017, the Ekics filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment and Order Granting Summary Judgment and For New Trial Pursuant to Rule 
59(a)(1(B) IRCP. R: 0247-250. On February 22, 2017, the Ekics filed an Objection to 
GEICO's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. R: 0251-5. 
The District Court issued its Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
and Orders Granting Summary Judgment and Denying Motion for New Trial on March 
2, 2017. R: 0256-9. On March 2, 2017, the District Court issued its Order Awarding 
Costs and Attorney Fees. R: 0260-3. The District Court issued a Judgment on March 
3, 2017. R: 0264-5. 
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On March 16, 2017, the Ekics filed a Motion to Set Aside the Trial Court's 
Order Granting Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. R: 0266-7. On 
March 27, 2017, the District Court issued an Amended Judgment. R: 0275-6. On April 
6, 2017, the District Court issued its Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Award of Costs 
and Attorney Fees. R: 0277-9. 
On April 12, 2017, the Ekics filed their Notice of Appeal. R: 0280-4. On 
May 15, 2017, the Ekics filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. R: 0300-5. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
The following facts are undisputed material facts that were stipulated to by 
the Ekics in their response brief on GEICO's first motion for summary judgment. R: 
0103 (Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment). On or about November 1, 2013, Aldina Ekic died in an automobile accident 
when she was a passenger in an automobile driven by Andrew Cassell. R: 082-6 
(Idaho Vehicle Collision Report). Andrew Cassell had an automobile policy with 
Progressive Insurance Company, which policy had limits of liability of $25,000. R: 011 
(Complaint, Par. VIII); R: 045 (Plaintiffs' Answers to Interrogatories, Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 16). The Ekics entered into a settlement with Andrew Cassell and 
Progressive for policy limits of $25,000. Id. 
At the time of the accident, Aldina Ekic owned an Idaho Family 
Automobile Insurance Company with GEICO, Policy No. 4248-93-31-05, effective dates 
June 25, 2013, to December 25, 2013, with UIM limits of $25,000/$50,000. R: 09 
(Complaint, Par. IV); R: 049-80 (GEICO Policy No. 4248-93-31-05). GEICO Policy No. 
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4248-93-31-05 contains an Underinsured Motorist Coverage Idaho Automobile Policy 
Amendment, which provides in relevant part: 
Under the Underinsured Motorist coverage, we will pay damages for 
bodily injury caused by an accident which the insured is legally entitled 
to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of that auto. 
R: 074 (A291 (06-12), page 3 of 4)(emphasis in original). The Declarations Page lists 
the Underinsured Motorist Coverage Idaho Automobile Policy J:'mendment, Form 
A291. R:50 (Declarations Page). The UIM Idaho Automobile Policy Amendment 
defines an "underinsured motor vehicle" as: 
"a motor vehicle insured under a motor vehicle liability policy but insured 
for an amount that is less than the underinsured motorist limits carried on 
the motor vehicle of the injured person." 
R: 072 (A291 (06-12), page 1 of 4). The UIM Idaho Automobile Policy Amendment 
provides that "if an insured is injured as a pedestrian or while occupying or using an 
auto not described in this policy, this insurance is excess over any other similar 
insurance available to the insured and the insurance which appli~s to the occupied 
auto is primary." R: 074 (A291 (06-12), page 3 of 4)(emphasis in original). Aldina Ekic 
paid $11.40 in premium for the UIM insurance. R: 049 (Declarations Page). 
The Ekics made a claim under Aldina Ekic's GEICO policy, and GEICO 
informed the Ekics that since the Ekics had received an amount, equal to the UIM 
coverage under the policy, there is no UIM coverage available under the GEICO 
policy. R: 011 (Complaint, Par. IX). The Ekics did not provide any evidence of 
representations made by GEICO or its agents other than Policy No. 4248-93-31-05. R: 
5 
042-3 (Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests, Answers to 
Interrogatories Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 13). 
IV. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
GEICO is seeking attorney fees on the basis that the Ekics' appeal is 
brought frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Ekics failed to preserve an objection to the Affidavit of Counsel 
fi led by GEICO in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and assuming for the 
sake of argument the Ekics did not waive any objection , the Affidavit of Counsel was 
properly admitted by the District Court. 
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(a), error may not be predicated on a 
ruling admitting evidence unless "a timely objection or motion to strike appears of 
record, stating the specific ground of objection ." See, Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 
687, 376 P.3d 464, 477 (2016)(declining to address appellant's arguments that the 
district court erred in admitting testimony where appellant did not raise 
objection). Here, the Ekics did not object to the Affidavit of Counsel filed by GEICO in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. In fact, in the Ekics' Memorandum in 
Opposition to GEICO's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Ekics stated, "Plaintiffs also 
have no dispute with the recitation of the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts as 
contained in pp. 2-3 of Defendant's Memorandum." R: p. 0103. GEICO's Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts was based on evidence contained in exhibits to the Affidavit 
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of Counsel filed by GEICO. The Ekics even cited to the Affidavit of GEICO's counsel in 
the Ekics' Memorandum in Opposition. R: p. 0104. Therefore, because the Ekics did 
not make an objection or a motion to strike with respect to the Affidavit of Counsel filed 
by GEICO, the Ekics may not raise on appeal an alleged error predicated on the Court's 
admission of the affidavit. 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Ekics had preserved the 
alleged error for appeal, the Affidavit of Counsel was properly admitted by the District 
Court. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support his 
assertion by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, 
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations 
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory 
answers, or other materials." I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1 )(A). An affidavit used to support or 
oppose a motion must be made upon personal knowledge, set out facts that would be 
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on 
the matters stated. I.R.C.P. 56(c)(4). 
Here, GEICO's attorney submitted an affidavit attaching the Ekics' 
Answers to GEICO's First Set of Discovery Requests, a copy of the liability insurance 
policy GEICO issued to Aldina Ekic, and a copy of the Idaho Vehicle Collision Report for 
the subject accident. R: pp. 35-86. The Ekics' Answers to GEICO's First Set of 
Discovery Requests were verified so they were self-authenticating. I.R.E. 
1007. GEICO's insurance policy was attached to the Ekics' verified Complaint as 
Exhibit A. R: pp. 8-15. The Vehicle Collision Report was produced with the Ekics' 
verified Answers to GEICO's First Set of Discovery Requests, and was attached to the 
7 
Answers. R: 46. Therefore, the Affidavit of Counsel and the exhibits attached to the 
affidavit were all properly admitted by the District Court. 
2. The District Court did not err in granting GEICO's First and Second 
Motions for Summary Judgment because there was no additional coverage under 
Aldina Ekic's UIM limits. 
The District Court properly granted GEICO's first and second motions for 
summary judgment because there was no additional coverage under Aldina Ekic's UIM 
limits. Idaho requires automobile insurers to offer their policyholders insurance "for the 
protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of uninsured and underinsured motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom." Idaho Code 
Section 41-2502(1 ). The minimum amount of required insurance is $25,000 per person 
and $50,000 per accident. Idaho Code Section 49-117(18). 
A) Breach of Contract Claim 
The Ekics assert that because their damages arising out of their 
daughter's death exceed the amount of $25,000, the policy limits provided by Andrew 
Cassell's liability insurance, Mr. Cassell became an underinsured motorist and therefor 
GEICO is liable to the Ekics under its UIM coverage. This argument for stacking of 
policy benefits was rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in Er/and v. Nationwide 
Insurance Co., 136 Idaho 131, 30 P.3d 286 (2001 )(reversing summary judgment 
against insurer under UIM provisions). There, a passenger was injured in a car 
accident. The passenger's daughter was the driver. The daughter's insurance policy 
had limits of $100,000, which the insurer paid to the passenger. The passenger then 
8 
made a UIM claim under her policy for $50,000. The passenger's insurer denied the 
claim because the policy contained anti-stacking language that stated if more than one 
insurance policy applied, the total applicable limit would not exceed the highest limit 
amount under any one of them. The passenger sued the insurer, and the district court 
granted summary judgment against the insurer. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court 
reversed. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in holding that the 
combined limits of both policies were available to the passenger. The passenger's UIM 
provision provided that if more than one policy applies, the total of the insured's 
recovery will not exceed the highest limit amount of any of them. The Supreme Court 
held that this provision was enforceable, and thus the passenger was limited to a 
recovery of $100,000. 
Similarly, in Howard v. Oregon Mutual Insurance Co., ·137 Idaho 214, 46 
P.3d 510 (2002)(affirming summary judgment for insurer), a driver was injured by 
another motorist whose policy paid its limit of $50,000 to the driver. The driver had UIM 
limits of $50,000, and sought recovery of UIM benefits. The insurance company 
brought a declaratory judgment action , and the district court ·granted summary 
judgment, finding no coverage under the policy's UIM provisions. On appeal, the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed: 
Consequently, we hold that the offset provision unambiguously provides 
that the amounts received from Pearce's insurer are applied to reduce the 
amount that Oregon Mutual would otherwise be obligated to pay under the 
UIM policy limits, as opposed to reducing the total amount of damages the 
Howards suffered. Oregon Mutual's obligation under the UIM coverage 
was therefore reduced to zero. We affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Oregon Mutual. 
Id., 137 Idaho at 219, 46 P.3d at 515. 
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In the case at hand, Aldina Ekic's GEICO policy provides that "if an 
insured is injured as a pedestrian or while occupying or using an auto not described in 
the policy, this insurance is excess over any other similar insurance available to the 
insured and the insurance which applies to the occupied auto is. primary." R: 075 
(GEICO policy A291 (06-12), page 3 of 4)(emphasis in original). A contract must be 
interpreted according to the plain meaning of the words used if the language is clear 
and unambiguous. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 141 
Idaho 660, 115 P.3d 751 (2005)(affirming summary judgment for inl5urer on breach of 
contract claim). If a provision in an insurance policy is unambiguous, coverage must be 
determined in accordance with the plain meaning of the words used. Markel 
International Insurance v. Erekson, 153 Idaho 107, 279 P.3d 93 (2012)(affirming ruling 
that insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify). Here, as in Er/and and Howard, where 
both policies provide limits of $25,000, the anti-stacking provision is enforceable, and 
the Ekics are limited to recovery of the $25,000 they obtained from Progressive. 
Additionally, the Ekics cannot recover under the GEICO policy because 
the Cassell vehicle does not qualify as an underinsured motor vehicl~ under the GEICO 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage Idaho Automobile Policy Amendment. The GEICO 
policy defines an "underinsured motor vehicle" as "a motor vehicle insured under a 
motor vehicle liability policy but insured for an amount that is less than the underinsured 
motorist limits carried on the motor vehicle of the injured person." R: .073 (GEICO policy 
A291 (06-12), page 1 of 4). Mr. Cassell's automobile was not insured for an amount 
that is less than the UIM limits carried on Aldina Ekic's motor vehicle. Therefore, by 
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definition, the Cassell vehicle was not an underinsured vehicle, and therefore the Ekics 
could not recover under the UIM portion of their daughter's GEICO policy. 
The Ekics asserted both at the District Court and on appeal that GEICO's 
UIM policy for the minimum financial limits allowed in Idaho is worthless and illusory. R: 
0182 (Amended Complaint, Par. VI). Policies that are approved by the Director of the 
Idaho Department of Insurance are presumed to be in accordance with public 
policy. Hansen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 
P .2d 97 4 (1987)(reversing judgment against insurer for underinsured motorist 
benefits). An insurance company's policy is illusory if 
It appears that if any actual coverage does exist it is extremely minimal 
and affords no realistic protection to any group or class of injured 
persons. The declarations page of the policy contains language and 
words of coverage, then by definition and exclusion takes away the 
coverage. The fact that there might be some small circumstance where 
coverage could arguably exist does not change the reality that, when the 
policy is considered in its entirety, the City was receiving only an illusion of 
coverage for its premiums. This Court will not allow policy limitations and 
exclusions to defeat the precise purpose for which the insurance is 
purchased. 
National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 541-2, 112 P.3d 825, 829-
830 (2005)(affirming summary judgment in favor of insurer and fin'ding coverage not 
illusory). 
In the case at hand, GEICO's UIM provisions are not illusory because they 
provide realistic protections. For example, the policy would provide for a recovery of 
UIM benefits from a tortfeasor with the required minimum liability limits from numerous 
states that are less than Idaho minimum limits of $25,000. See, Arizona Revised 
Statutes, Section 28-4009(2) ($15,000/$30,000/$10,000); California Insurance Code 
11 
Section 1580(b) ($15,000/$30,000/$5,000); Connecticut General Statutes Section 14-
112(a) ($20,000/$40,000/$10,000); Delaware Code Section 2902 
($15,000/$30,000/$10,000); Florida Statute tit. XXII, Section 324.021 
($10,000/$20,000/$10,000) 1 ; Hawaii tit. 24, Section 431.10 C-301 
($20,000/$40,000/$10,000); Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 32-900 
($15,000/$30,000/$25,000); Massachusetts Gen. Laws ch. 90, Section 34A 
($20,000/$40,000/$8,000); Michigan Compiled Laws 257.520(b), 500.3009 
($20,000/$40,000/$10,000); 
($15,000/$30,000/$10,000); 
Nevada 
New 
Revised 
Jersey 
Statutes Section 485.185 
Statutes Am. @ 39.6A-3 
($15,000/$30,000/$5,000); 75 Pennsylvania Comm. Statutes Section 1702 
($15,000/$30,000/$5,000). In addition, the GEICO policy would potentially provide for 
a recovery in a situation in which there were multiple claimants and insufficient 
insurance. The fact that Aldina Ekic's policy does not provide a benefit under the facts 
of this case does not render the coverage illusory. Aldina Ekic paid a premium of 
$11 .40 to purchase her UIM insurance. R: 049 (GEICO Declarations Page). Ms. Ekic 
elected to purchase UIM coverage for the same amount she purchased for her liability 
coverage. Ms. Ekic could have chosen to pay additional premium for a higher UIM 
limit. 
The Ekics argue that three opinions from other jurisdictions "essentially 
held that the positioning of the disclaimer language buried at the end of the policy with 
no link or reference to the language contained on the Declaration Page was clearly 
intended to obscure and conceal the disclaimer language from the insured and was 
1 Florida allows the purchase of a policy for personal injury protection and property damage liability for $10,000 
only. Florida Statutes Annotated Section 627.736. 
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construed as constituting a waiver and/or non-enforceable disclaimer in favor of the 
insured against the insurance companies in those three cases." Appellants' Brief, p. 
1.18. There is no reason for the court to consider these cases because Idaho law is 
clear. However, even if the court elects to consider these cases, review of the three 
intermediate appellate court opinions reveals that they should not be considered 
persuasive. 
Dowhower v. Marquez, 659 N.W.2d 57 (Wisc.Ct.App. 2003), is a decision 
by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, the intermediate appellate court in that state. The 
decision was reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and then remanded to the 
intermediate appellate court for further consideration in light of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court's opinion in Folkman v. Quamme, 665 N.W.2d 857 (Wisc. 2003). Dowhower v. 
Marquez, 668 N.W.2d 735(Wisc. 2003). In a subsequent opinion, the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals modified its discussion of the impact of the declarations page in light of the 
Folkman opinion. Recognizing the position of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that a 
declarations page is intended to provide a summary of coverage and cannot provide a 
complete picture of coverage under a policy, the Court of Appeals then found that under 
the specific circumstances of the Dowhower case the declaration page "in no way 
assists the insured in understanding that the limits of liability are subject to conditions 
and exceptions set forth later in the policy ... ," and that "the declarations mislead the 
insured about where to find the UIM coverage in the policy." Dowhower v. Marquez, 
674 N.W.2d 906, 913-4 (Wisc.Ct.App. 2003). In 2006, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
distinguished the holding of Dowhower in Dempich v. Pekin Insurance Co., 710 N.W.2d 
691 (Wisc.Ct.App. 2006). In Dempich, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that the 
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declarations page in the subject insurance policy was "a serviceable road map to the 
policy." Id., 710 N.W.2d at 696. Underinsured motorist coverage had its own line in the 
"coverages" section, instead of being subsumed by the line item for uninsured motorist 
coverage as it was in Dowhower. Id. Unlike Dowhower, the insured was made aware 
of the existence of endorsements to the policy on the declarations page in a separate 
section entitled "policy endorsements." Id. The endorsement for UIM coverage was 
referenced on the declarations page, which was determined by Folkman to be '"the 
most crucial section of the policy for the typical insured."' Id., (quoting, Folkman, supra, 
665 N.W.2d 857). Thus, in Dempich the appellate court found the UIM endorsement to 
be enforceable. Id. 
Dowhower is also distinguishable from the case at hand. The declarations 
page in the UIM policy listed the UIM coverage as "$50,000 each person $100,000 each 
accident," and did not provide any further explanation of the extent of the policy's UIM 
coverage. Dowhower, supra, 674 S.W.2d at 914. The Dowhower Court found that the 
declarations page "in no way assists the insured in understanding the limits of liability 
are subject to conditions and exceptions set forth later in the policy." Id. The Dowhower 
Court also found that the declarations page mislead the insured about where to find the 
UIM coverage in the policy because UIM coverage was listed under "Coverage C" 
"uninsured motorist coverage," but the policy's uninsured motorists coverage did not 
even reference UIM coverage. Id. Conversely, in the Ekic policy, UIM coverage 
has its 9wn line in the Coverages section . The limits of UIM coverage are clearly 
shown. On the second page of the Declarations Page, the UIM endorsement, Form 
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A291, is specifically referenced. Uninsured motorist coveragE: is provided for 
separately, and this is not confusing. 
Long v. Shelter Insurance Companies, 351 S.W.3d 692 (Mo.Ct.App. 
2011 ), is an opinion by the Missouri Court of Appeals, the intermediate appellate court 
in that state. In Long, the insurer refused to stack UIM coverage u~der six policies on 
the basis that a general anti-stacking provision in those six policies unambiguously 
prohibited stacking of UIM coverage. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals found 
the policy to be ambiguous. In analyzing the policy as a whole, the appellate court 
found that the language in the policies' "other insurance" clauses c<;>uld be reasonably 
interpreted by an ordinary person of average understanding to mean that the UIM 
coverage would provide excess coverage to all other UIM policies, whether sold by 
other companies or by Shelter. The promise of excess UIM coverage conveyed in the 
"other insurance" clause conflicted with the general anti-stacking pro~ision, which stated 
that the insurer's liability under all its policies would not exceed the highest limit of any 
one policy. The anti-stacking provision took away that promised excess insurance by 
limiting Shelter's liability to the maximum UIM coverage available under one of its 
policies. Long's discussion of the flaws in the declaration page was part of a 
comprehensive discussion of what the court perceived as flaws in Shelter's policy. 
The application of Long is severely limited by the recent en bane Missouri 
Supreme Court opinion in Owners Insurance Co. v. Craig, 514 S.W.3d 614 (Mo. 
2017). There the district court entered summary judgment in favor of policyholders that 
denied the insurer the right to reduce the amount paid pursuant to its UIM coverage by 
the amount paid by the at-fault motorist's liability insurer. On appeal, the Supreme 
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Court reversed. The Court found that the offset provision was clear and 
unambiguous. The Supreme Court also rejected the policyholders'. argument that the 
declarations page was misleading: 
While the Craigs point to the declarations' listed limit amount and other 
portions of the policy that make bare, general references to the 
declarations containing the limit of liability, the declarations "are 
introductory only and subject to refinement and definition in the body of 
the policy." Peters v. Farmers Ins. Co., 726 S.W.2d 749, 75~ (Mo. bane 
1987). The declarations "do not grant any coverage. The declarations 
state the policy's essential terms in an abbreviated form, and when the 
policy is read as a whole, it is clear that a reader must look elsewhere to 
determine the scope of coverage." Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 
439 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Mo. bane 2014). Evaluating the policy as a whole, 
it unambiguously provides that the declarations' listed limit amount serves 
only as a reference point for use with the set-off provisions, which are 
likewise unambiguous. 
Id, 514 S.W.3d at 617-18; see also, GEICO Casualty Co. v. Clampitt, 521 S.W.3d 290 
(Mo.Ct.App.Div. 3 2017)(reversing summary judgment declaring that UIM coverage 
limits on three vehicles could be stacked, and noting that insurance policy has to be 
read as a whole, and the fact that the declarations page did not, expressly prohibit 
stacking did not create an ambiguity). The holdings in Owners and Clampitt indicate 
that the Missouri courts have evolved to take a position more consistent with that taken 
by Idaho courts in construing the entire policy as a whole. 
Long is also distinguishable from the instant case. ,Long was about 
stacking, which is not the issue here. Further, in Long, the Court criticized the 
declarations page because it informed the insured that UIM coverage was $100,000 per 
person/$300,000 per accident. There was nothing to indicate to the insured that the 
limits were subject to set-off or reduction. However, here GEICO'~ Declaration Page 
directs the policy holder to the endorsements, including A291, the UIM 
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endorsement. When construing the GEICO policy as a whole, there is no ambiguity and 
nothing to mislead the insured. 
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Davis, 600 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App.Div. 
2nd Dept. 1993), the New York Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court in that 
state, held in a Memorandum Decision that an insurer was not entitled to set off the 
amount the policyholder had recovered from another tortfeasor because the 
declarations page did not indicate that the payment of underinsured motorist benefits 
would be subject to a reduction. In Allstate Insurance Co v. Urban, 23 F.Supp.2d 324 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998), the Court noted that the New York Court of Appeals held in Matter of 
Arbitration between Allstate Insurance Company and Stolarz (Kathleen), New Jersey 
Manufacturers Insurance Co., 613 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1993), that the decisions in Davis 
and similar cases were "strictly limited to situations where the policy in question was for 
under insurance not a combined underinsurance and uninsurance poli~y." Allstate 
Insurance Co. v. Urban, supra, 23 F.Supp.2d at 325 (emphasis in original). Therefore, 
where the insurance policy at issue clearly is a combination underinsured/uninsured 
policy, the courts have refused to follow the rationale set forth in Davis, and have 
permitted a set-off. Id. 
Davis was decided before the adoption of regulations· by the New York 
Superintendent of Insurance approving single limits and specifically requiring reduction 
in coverage for amounts recovered from underinsured drivers. 11 NYCRR 60-
2.1; see discussion in Matter of Allstate Insurance Co. (Stolarz), supra, 613 N.E.2d at 
938; and see GEICO v. O'Haire, 667 N.Y.S.2d 917 (App.Div. 2d Dept. 1998)(set off 
provision in insurance policy is enforceable even where the provision is not contained in 
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the declaration page). In addition, the fact pattern presented in Davis is not analogous 
to the case at bar. In Davis, the declaration page did not have any, indication that the 
payment of UIM benefits would be subject to reduction. The appellate court also found 
the coverage amount was misleading to the extent that it purported to reduce the UIM 
coverage so as to spare the insurer from ever having to pay a coverage limit. Here, 
GEICO's policy refers the insured to the UIM endorsement, Form A491. The coverage 
amount is not misleading. Further, here Aldina Ekic did not meet the definition of an 
underinsured driver under her policy, since her limits were identical to Mr. Cassell's. 
The Declarations Page used in Aldina Ekic's GEICO policy provides a 
"serviceable roadmap" to the policy. UIM coverage has its own lin~ in the Coverages 
section. The limits of the UIM coverage are clearly shown. On the second page of the 
Declarations Page, the UIM endorsement, Form A291, is specifically referenced. Here, 
Aldina Ekic was made aware of the existence of Form A291, the Automobile Policy 
Amendment Underinsured Motorist Coverage Idaho. Thus, t~e GEICO policy 
unambiguously set forth Ms. Ekic's UIM coverage and its limitations. 
Therefore, because of the anti-stacking provision in GEICO's policy, as 
well as the fact that the Cassell vehicle does not qualify as an underinsured motor 
vehicle, the District Court properly granted summary judgment to G~ICO on the Ekics' 
breach of contract claim. 
(B) Misrepresentation Claim 
The District Court properly granted GEICO's motion for summary 
judgment as to the Ekics' misrepresentation claim. Although the ,Ekics alleged that 
misrepresentations were made by GEICO's agent inducing Aldina Ekic to purchase her 
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automobile liability policy, the Ekics produced no evidence to support this 
allegation. GEICO propounded interrogatories to the Ekics, and specifically asked the 
Ekics to identify "each and every statement of fact Plaintiffs believe were untrue or 
misstatements." R: 042-3 (Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First Set of Discovery, 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 11). The Ekics responded that the "initial representations 
were made in the policy language itself. Additional misrepresentations are anticipated 
in discovery and deposition testimony of the sales agent who sold the subject policy to 
insured decedent." Id. 
If a party fails to properly address an assertion of fact or fails to properly 
address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may grant 
summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials, including the facts 
considered undisputed, show that the movant is entitled to it. I.R.C.P. 56(e)(3). Where 
the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, to prevail on summary judgment 
the moving party need only point out an absence of evidence supporting the non-
moving party's claims. See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester, and Lezamiz, Inc., 134 
Idaho 84, 88, 996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000). "[A] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight 
doubt as to the facts" is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of 
summary judgment. Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho 437, 439, 958 P.2d 594, 596 
(1998). The non-moving party "must respond to the summary judgment motion with 
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Samuel, 134 Idaho at 87, 996 
P.2d at 306. "Therefore, the moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving 
party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element to that 
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Thomas v. Med. 
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Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557, 562 (2002). Since the Ekics 
did not come forward with specific evidence to support their misrepresentation claim, 
the District Court properly granted summary judgment to GEICO on the Ekics' claim for 
misrepresentation. 
(C) Bad Faith Claim 
The District Court properly granted GEICO's motion for summary 
judgment as to the Ekics' bad faith claim. Idaho recognizes an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in every insurance contract. Simper v. Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company ofldaho, 132 Idaho 471, 974 P.2d 1100 (1999)(affirming summary 
judgment in favor of insurer). In order to recover on a bad faith claim, the insured must 
show: (1) the insurer intentionally and unreasonably denied or delayed payment; (2) the 
claim was not fairly debatable; (3) the denial or delay of payment was not the result of a 
good faith mistake; and (4) the resulting harm is not fully compensable by contract 
damages. Id. 
In the case at bar, there was no evidence to support the Ekics' bad faith 
claim against GEICO. First, GEICO did not breach its contract with Aldina Ekic, and 
therefore it did not unreasonably deny payment. Second, even if the District Court had 
rejected GEICO's coverage analysis, the claim was fairly debatable. An insurer does 
not act in bad faith if it challenges the validity of a "fairly debatable" claim. McGilvray V. 
Farmers New World Life Insurance Co., 136 Idaho 39, 28 P.3d 380 (2001)(affirming 
summary judgment for insurer). When a claim is fairly debatable the insurer is entitled 
to dispute the claim and will not be deemed liable in bad faith for failure to pay the claim. 
Id. 
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Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment to 
GEICO as to the Ekics' bad faith claim. 
(D) Promissory Estoppel Claim 
After GEICO filed its first motion for summary judgment, the Ekics filed a 
motion for leave to amend their complaint to add a cause of action for promissory 
estoppel. The District Court granted leave to the Ekics to amend. GEICO then filed its 
second motion for summary judgment on the promissory estoppe'I claim, which the 
District Court properly granted. 
The Ekics allege that Aldina Ekic purchased UIM insurance with limits of 
$25,000 from GEICO in reliance on the Declarations Page; that GEICO's failure to pay 
under the UIM insurance caused a substantial economic loss to tne Ekics; that this 
economic loss was foreseeable to GEICO, because the offset provisions drafted by 
GEICO put GEICO on notice that typically an insured who purchases $25,000 in UIM 
insurance would have zero recovery from any Idaho insured or out of state driver having 
limits of $25,000; and that Aldina Ekic acted reasonably in reliance' on the promise of 
$25,000 in coverage which Aldina Ekic believed she was purchasing. Thus, the Ekics 
assert that GEICO is liable to them under a theory of promissory estoppel. 
The elements of promissory estoppel are 1) the detriment suffered in 
reliance was substantial in an economic sense; 2) substantial los·s of the promisee 
acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and 3) the 
promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as 
made. Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 138 Idaho 27, 56 P.3d 1277 
(2002). When promissory estoppel is found, it acts as · a substitute for 
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consideration. Id. If there was consideration for the parties' agreement, then there is no 
need to apply the promissory estoppel doctrine to apply consideration. Id. 
Turning to the case at hand, the Ekics' claim of promi~sory estoppel fails 
because there is no evidence of a promise made by GEICO to Aldina Ekic different from 
the express terms of the insurance policy. Aldina Ekic's policy clearly provided UIM 
insurance with limits of $25,000. This is the insurance Aldina Ekic chose to 
purchase. Although Ms. Ekic's UIM insurance did not provide an, additional benefit 
under the circumstances of this case, as was previously discussed this did not make her 
coverage illusory. 
In addition, there was consideration for the parties' agreement. In return 
for Aldina Ekic's payment of $11 .40 in premium, GEICO provided ,Ms. Ekic with UIM 
insurance with limits of $25,000. The fact that Ms. Ekic chose to spend only $11.40 to 
purchase her UIM coverage does not eliminate the presence of consideration. Since 
consideration exists, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not available. 
Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summarv judgment on the 
promissory estoppel claim. 
3. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Ekics' 
Motion to Defer Hearing on Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment for 60 
Days And For Additional Time Pursuant to Rule 56(d)(1) and (2) IRCf;>. 
The District Court properly denied the Ekics' eleventh hour motion to 
continue the hearing on GEICO's second motion for summary judgment. On November 
1, 2016, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion to Continue Trial. R: 0209. In the 
Stipulated Motion, the parties represented to the Court that "Defend~nt anticipates that 
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it will bring a second motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' new claim of 
promissory estoppel." R: 0210. The Court granted the Stipulated Motion. R: 
0211. The Court convened a telephonic status conference, and subsequently issued a 
Scheduling Order, setting oral argument on GEICO's second motion for summary 
judgment for January 30, 2017. R: 0213. GEICO filed its second motion for summary 
judgment on December 14, 2016. R: 0215. This provided the Ekics approximately one 
month to file their response. See, I.R.C.P. 56(b)(2). 
Approximately two weeks prior to the scheduled hepring on GEICO's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, the Ekics filed a Motion to Defer Hearing on 
Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment for 60 days And For Additional 
Time Pursuant to Rule 56(d)(1) and (2) IRCP. Rule 56(d) provides: 
If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration th9t, for 
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify 
its opposition, the court may: 
(1) defer considering the motion or deny it; 
(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to 
take discovery; or 
(3) issue any other appropriate orde.r. 
I.R.C.P. 56(d). The decision to grant or deny a continuance on a IT)Otion for summary 
judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Wolford v. Montee, 161 Idaho 
432, 387 P.3d 100 (2017)(affirming denial of motion to continue hearing on motion for 
summary judgment). When seeking a continuance on a motion for summary judgment, 
the moving party must '"affirmatively demonstrate [ ] why he car;mot respond to a 
movant's affidavits ... and how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, 
by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a 
genuine issue of fact.'" Id., 161 Idaho at 438, 387 P.3d at 106 (quoting, Jenkins v. Boise 
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Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380, 386 (2005)). The movant "has the 
burden of setting out what further discovery would reveal that is essential to justify their 
opposition, making clear what information is sought and how it would preclude summary 
judgment." Id. A trial court does not abuse its discretion it if (1) correctly perceives the 
issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct 
legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason. Elliott v. 
Murdock, 161 Idaho 281, 385 P.3d 459 (2016)(trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying discovery request). 
Additionally, litigants must comply with the District Court's scheduling 
orders, and failure to comply with such orders may result in sanctions. I.R.C.P. 16(i); 
Krinitt v. Idaho Department of Fish and Game, 162 Idaho 425, 398 P.3d 158 (2017) 
(district court did not abuse discretion by failing to dismiss summary judgment motion as 
sanction for violating scheduling order). I.R.C.P. 16(a) empowers district courts to 
fashion scheduling orders for effective case management. Id. 
Turning to the case at hand, the District Court found that good cause did 
not exist to continue the hearing, and ordered that the February 2, 2017 hearing on the 
second motion for summary judgment remain on its calendar. The Ekics' attorney filed 
an affidavit in which he stated that he had been out of town for extended time periods in 
November and December 2016, and had been "unable to dedicate sufficient time for 
discovery in the instant case until early January, 2017, pertaining to the additional 
promissory estoppel claim ... " R: 0225. The Ekics did not articulate how postponement 
of the hearing would enable them to rebut GEICO's showing of the absence of a 
genuine issue of fact. The Ekics did not set out what further discovery would reveal that 
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is essential to justify their opposition, making clear what information is sought and how it 
would preclude summary judgment. 
In addition, the Ekics clearly had sufficient time to conduct discovery on 
their promissory estoppel claim. The Ekics filed their Motion to Amend Complaint on 
May 5, 2016. R: 0114. The Ekics did not set the motion for hearing.· The District Court 
issued an Order for Plaintiffs to File the Proposed Amended Complaint on August 10, 
2016. R: 0170. The Ekics filed their First Amended Complaint on August 15, 2016. R: 
0180. The District Court issued an Order Granting Motion to Permit Filing of Amended 
Complaint. R: 0189. 
It is clear that the district Court intended in its Scheduling Order to have 
the litigants diligently resolve the remaining dispositive motion issue as proceeding to 
trial. The parties had jointly represented to the District Court on November 1, 2017 that 
GEICO would be bringing a second motion for summary judgment "as to Plaintiffs' new 
claim of promissory estoppel." R: 0210. The District Court granted the stipulated 
motion, and then held a scheduling conference. R: 0211-3. As a result of the 
scheduling conference and order, a hearing was scheduled to occur January 30, 2017. 
R: 0213. GEICO then filed its second motion for summary judgment on December 14, 
2017. R: 0213. 
The Ekics propounded interrogatories and requests for production to 
GEICO on September 15, 2016, R: 0201. GEICO filed an Answer to the amended 
Complaint on October 5, 2016, R: 0202, and then served answers and responses to the 
Ekics' discovery on October 26, 2016. R: 0207. It was obvious from at least November 
1, 2016 that GEICO planned to seek summary judgment on the promissory estoppel 
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claim. The Ekics had essentially eight months to conduct discovery on their promissory 
estoppel claim, but limited their discovery to written interrogatories and requests for 
production. The Ekics never noticed a deposition of anyone.· At the very least, the 
Ekics could have noticed a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of GEICO. Clearly, the Ekics did 
not demonstrate good cause for the postponement of the hearing, and they did not 
diligently pursue discovery as envisioned by the District Court in its Scheduling Order. 
Accordingly, the District Court properly exercised its discretion in finding 
that the Ekics did not show good cause in their motion to continue the hearing on 
GEICO's second motion for summary judgment. 
4. The District Court did not err in awarding GEICO attorney fees because 
the District Court found that the Ekics had brought their case frivolously, unreasonably 
and without foundation. 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Idaho Code Section 12-121; 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). An award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 will 
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Idaho Military Historical Society, Inc. v. 
Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 329 P.3d 1072 (2014)(affirming district court's award of attorney 
fees). 
Here, GEICO filed a Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, and 
asserted that the Ekics' filing of their original complaint, the Ekics' opposition to 
GEICO's first motion for summary judgment, the Ekics' filing of their motion to amend, 
and the Ekics' opposition to GEICO's second motion for summary judgment constituted 
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frivolous conduct. R: 0235. An affidavit of GEICO's counsel contained within the 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees set forth the required information explaining 
the attorn~y fee request. After the Ekics filed an objection to GEICO's Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorney Fees, R: 0251, the District Court issued its Ord~r Awarding Costs 
and Attorney Fees. R: 0260. In its decision, the District Court properly found that 
GEICO was the prevailing party. The District Court then found that the case "was 
brought without foundation." Id. The District Court noted that the "anti-stacking 
provision in Aldina Ekic's automobile insurance policy, together wi,th Idaho Supreme 
Court precedent that is directly on point, clearly precluded this action." Id. The District 
Court also found that the amount of time and billing rate for GEICO's attorneys were 
reasonable. Id. Accordingly, the District Court properly awarded attorney fees in favor 
of GEICO against the Ekics because they brought their lawsuit unreasonably and 
without foundation. 
5. GEICO should be awarded attorney fees on appeal. 
GEICO asserts that it should be awarded attorney fees on this appeal 
pursuant to I.A.R. 41. The basis for the claim for attorney fees is tha~ the Ekics brought 
their appeal frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. Attorney fees can be 
awarded on appeal under Idaho Code Section 12-121 if the appeal was brought or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 
225, 159 P.3d 862 (2007)(awarding attorney fees because appeal ~rought frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation). 
Here, as at the District Court level, the Ekics have brought their appeal 
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. The Ekics argue that the District 
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Court improperly admitted the affidavit of counsel in support of GEICO's first motion for 
summary judgment where the Ekics did not object to the affidavit and in fact stipulated 
that GEICO's Statement of Material Undisputed Facts was correct. The Ekics have 
come forward with no arguments to justify their claims. The Ekics cannot support their 
eleventh hour attempt to delay the hearing on GEICO's second motion for summary 
judgment. The Ekics also cannot show why their Complaint was not brought frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. Accordingly, GEICO requests that it be granted 
attorney fees on appeal. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, GEICO requests that the District Court's 
decisions be affirmed in all respects, and that GEICO be awarded its attorney fees on 
appeal. 
DATED this 23rd day of October, 2017. 
PERKINS,~ L Jm CALLISTER LLP 
By:"7l,-
Richard L. Stubbs, of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of October, 2017 I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by delivering the same to 
each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Kenneth 0. Kreis 
Kreis Law',Offices 
P.O. Box 4811 
Boise, Idaho 83711 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appel/ants 
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